middling and inferior ranks of people in Scotland
gained a complete deliverance from the
power of an aristocracy, which had always before
oppressed them. By a union with Great
Britain, the greater part of people of all ranks
in Ireland would gain an equally complete
deliverance from a much more oppressive aristocracy;
an aristocracy not founded, like that
of Scotland, in the natural and respectable distinctions
of birth and fortune, but in the most
odious of all distinctions, those of religious and
political prejudices; distinctions which, more
than any other, animate both the insolence of
the oppressors, and the hatred and indignation
of the oppressed, and which commonly render
the inhabitants of the same country more hostile
to one another than those of different
countries ever are. Without a union with
Great Britain, the inhabitants of Ireland are
not likely, for many ages, to consider themselves
as one people.
No oppressive aristocracy has ever prevailed
in the colonies. Even they, however, would,
in point of happiness and tranquillity, gain
considerably by a union with Great Britain.
It would, at least, deliver them from those
rancourous and virulent factions which are
inseparable from small democracies, and which
have so frequently divided the affections of
their people, and disturbed the tranquillity of
their governments, in their form so nearly
democratical. In the case of a total separation
from Great Britain, which, unless prevented
by a union of this kind, seems very
likely to take place, those factions would be
ten times more virulent than ever. Before
the commencement of the present disturbances,
the coercive power of the mother-country had
always been able to restrain those factions
from breaking out into any thing worse than
gross brutality and insult. If that coercive
power were entirely taken away, they would
probably soon break out into open violence
and bloodshed. In all great countries which
are united under one uniform government, the
spirit of party commonly prevails less in the
remote provinces than in the centre of the empire.
The distance of those provinces from
the capital, from the principal seat of the great
scramble of faction and ambition, makes them
enter less into the views of any of the contending
parties, and renders them more indifferent
and impartial spectators of the conduct of all.
The spirit of party prevails less in Scotland than
in England. In the case of a union, it would
probably prevail less in Ireland than in Scotland;
and the colonies would probably soon
enjoy a degree of concord and unanimity, at
present unknown in any part of the British
empire. Both Ireland and the colonies, indeed,
would be subjected to heavier taxes than
any which they at present pay. In consequence,
however, of a diligent and faithful
application of the public revenue towards the
discharge of the national debt, the greater
part of those taxes might not be of long continuance,
and the public revenue of Great
Britain might soon be reduced to what was
necessary for maintaining a moderate peace-establishment.
The territorial acquisitions of the East-India
Company, the undoubted right of the
Crown, that is, of the state and people of
Great Britain, might be rendered another
source of revenue, more abundant, perhaps,
than all those already mentioned. Those
countries are represented as more fertile, more
extensive, and, in proportion to their extent,
much richer and more populous than Great
Britain. In order to draw a great revenue
from them, it would not probably be necessary
to introduce any new system of taxation
into countries which are already sufficiently,
and more than sufficiently, taxed. It might,
perhaps, be more proper to lighten than to aggravate
the burden of those unfortunate countries,
and to endeavour to draw a revenue from
them, not by imposing new taxes, but by preventing
the embezzlement and misapplication
of the greater part of those which they already
pay.
If it should be found impracticable for
Great Britain to draw any considerable augmentation
of revenue from any of the resources
above mentioned, the only resource which
can remain to her, is a diminution of her expense.
In the mode of collecting and in that
of expending the public revenue, though in
both there may be still room for improvement,
Great Britain seems to be at least as economical
as any of her neighbours. The military
establishment which she maintains for her
own defence in time of peace, is more moderate
than that of any European state, which
can pretend to rival her either in wealth
or in power. None of those articles, therefore,
seem to admit of any considerable reduction
of expense. The expense of the
peace-establishment of the colonies was, before
the commencement of the present disturbances,
very considerable, and is an expense which
may, and, if no revenue can be drawn from
them, ought certainly to be saved altogether.
This constant expense in time of peace, though
very great, is insignificant in comparison with
what the defence of the colonies has cost us
in time of war. The last war, which was undertaken
altogether on account of the colonies,
cost Great Britain, it has already been observed,
upwards of ninety millions. The Spanish
war of 1739 was principally undertaken on
their account; in which, and in the French
war that was the consequence of it, Great Britain,
spent upwards of forty millions; a great
part of which ought justly to be charged to
the colonies. In those two wars, the colonies
cost Great Britain much more than double the
sum which the national debt amounted to before
the commencement of the first of them.
Had it not been for those wars, that debt