fertility of the soil, and happiness of the climate,
could preserve such countries from soon
relapsing into the lowest state of poverty and
barbarism.
Taxes upon consumable commodities may
either be levied by an administration, of which
the officers are appointed by government, and
immediately accountable to government,
of which the revenue must, in this case, vary
from year to year, according to the occasional
variations in the produce of the tax; or they
may be let in farm for a rent certain, the farmer
being allowed to appoint his own officers,
who, though obliged to levy the tax in the
manner directed by the law, are under his
immediate inspection, and are immediately
accountable to him. The best and most frugal
way of levying a tax can never be by
farm. Over and above what is necessary for
paying the stipulated rent, the salaries of the
officers, and the whole expense of administration,
the farmer must always draw from
the produce of the tax a certain profit, proportioned
at least to the advance which he makes,
to the risk which he runs, to the trouble which
he is at, and to the knowledge and skill which
it requires to manage so very complicated a
concern. Government, by establishing an administration
under their own immediate inspection,
of the same kind with that which the
farmer establishes, might at least save this
profit, which is almost always exorbitant. To
farm any considerable branch of the public revenue
requires either a great capital, or a great
credit; circumstances which would alone restrain
the competition for such an undertaking
to a very small number of people. Of the few
who have this capital or credit, a still smaller
number have the necessary knowledge or experience;
another circumstance which restrains
the competition still further. The very few
who are in condition to become competitors,
find it more for their interest to combine together;
to become copartners, instead of competitors;
and, when the farm is set up to
auction, to offer no rent but what is much below
the rent value. In countries where the
public revenues are in farm, the farmers are
generally the most opulent people. Their
wealth would alone excite the public indignation;
and the vanity which almost always
accompanies such upstart fortunes, the foolish
ostentation with which they commonly
display that wealth, excite that indignation
still more.
The farmers of the public revenue never
find the laws too severe, which punish any attempt
to evade the payment of a tax. They
have no bowels for the contributors, who are
not their subjects, and whose universal bankruptcy,
if it should happen the day after the
farm is expired, would not much affect their
interest. In the greatest exigencies of the
state, when the anxiety of the sovereign for
the exact payment of his revenue is necessarily
the greatest, they seldom fail to complain, that
without laws more rigorous than those which
actually took place, it will be impossible for
them to pay even the usual rent. In those
moments of public distress, their commands
cannot be disputed. The revenue laws, therefore,
become gradually more and more severe.
The most sanguinary are always to be found
in countries where the greater part of the public
revenue is in farm; the mildest, in countries
where it is levied under the immediate
inspection of the sovereign. Even a bad sovereign
feels more compassion for his people
than can ever be expected from the farmers
of his revenue. He knows that the permanent
grandeur of his family depends upon
the prosperity of his people, and he will never
knowingly ruin that prosperity for the sake
of any momentary interest of his own. It
is otherwise with the farmers of his revenue,
whose grandeur may frequently be the effect
of the ruin, and not of the prosperity, of his
people.
A tax is sometimes not only farmed for a
certain rent, but the farmer has, besides, the
monopoly of the commodity taxed. In France,
the duties upon tobacco and salt are levied in
this manner. In such cases, the farmer, instead
of one, levies two exorbitant profits upon
the people; the profit of the farmer, and
the still more exorbitant one of the monopolist.
Tobacco being a luxury, every man is
allowed to buy or not to buy as he chuses;
but salt being a necessary, every man is obligated
to buy of the farmer a certain quantity
of it; because, if he did not buy this quantity
of the farmer, he would, it is presumed,
buy it of some smuggler. The taxes upon
both commodities are exorbitant. The temptation
to smuggle, consequently, is to many
people irresistible; while, at the same time,
the rigour of the law, and the vigilance of
the farmer's officers, render the yielding to the
temptation almost certainly ruinous. The
smuggling of salt and tobacco sends every
year several hundred people to the galleys,
besides a very considerable number whom it
sends to the gibbet. Those taxes, levied in
this manner, yield a very considerable revenue
to government. In 1767, the farm
of tobacco was let for twenty-two millions
five hundred and forty-one thousand two
hundred and seventy-eight livres a-year; that
of salt for thirty-six millions four hundred
and ninety-two thousand four hundred and
four livres. The farm, in both cases, was to
commence in 1768, and to last for six
years. These who consider the blood of the
people as nothing, in comparison with the
revenue of the prince, may, perhaps, approve
of this method of levying taxes. Similar
taxes and monopolies of salt and tobacco have
been established in many other countries, particularly
in the Austrian and Prussian dominions,