as it affected profit, fall altogether upon
that of the maltster; that the maltster could
not so easily get back the amount of the tax
in the advanced price of his malt, as the brewer
and retailer in the advanced price of their
liquor; and that so heavy a tax upon malt
might reduce the rent and profit of barley
land.
No tax can ever reduce, for any considerable
time, the rate of profit in any particular
trade, which must always keep its level with
other trades in the neighbourhood. The present
duties upon malt, beer, and ale, do not
affect the profits of the dealers in those commodities,
who all get back the tax with an
additional profit, in the enhanced price of
their goods. A tax, indeed, may render the
goods upon which it is imposed so dear, as to
diminish the consumption of them. But the
consumption of malt is in malt liquors; and
a tax of eighteen shillings upon the quarter
of malt could not well render those liquors
dearer than the different taxes, amounting to
twenty-four or twenty-five shillings, do at
present. Those liquors, on the contrary,
would probably become cheaper, and the
consumption of them would be more likely to
increase than to diminish.
It is not very easy to understand why it
should be more difficult for the maltster to get
back eighteen shillings in the advanced price
of his malt, than it is at present for the brewer
to get back twenty-four or twenty-five,
sometimes thirty shillings, in that of his liquor.
The maltster, indeed, instead of a tax
of six shillings, would be obliged to advance
one of eighteen shillings upon every quarter
of malt. But the brewer is at present obliged
to advance a tax of twenty-four or twenty-five,
sometimes thirty shillings, upon every
quarter of malt which he brews. It could
not be more inconvenient for the maltster to
advance a lighter tax, than it is at present for
the brewer to advance a heavier one. The
maltster does not always keep in his granaries
a stock of malt, which it will require a
longer time to dispose of than the stock of
beer and ale which the brewer frequently
keeps in his cellars. The former, therefore,
may frequently get the returns of his money
as soon as the latter. But whatever inconveniency
might arise to the maltster from
being obliged to advance a heavier tax, it
could easily be remedied, by granting him a
few months longer credit than is at present
commonly given to the brewer.
Nothing could reduce the rent and profit
of barley land, which did not reduce the demand
for barley. But a change of system,
which reduced the duties upon a quarter of
malt brewed into beer and ale, from twenty-four
and twenty-five shillings to eighteen
shillings, would be more likely to increase
than diminish that demand. The rent and
profit of barley land, besides, must always be
nearly equal to those of other equally fertile
and equally well cultivated land. If they
were less, some part of the barley land would
soon be turned to some other purpose; and
if they were greater, more land would soon
be turned to the raising of barley. When
the ordinary price of any particular produce
of land is at what may be called a monopoly
price, a tax upon it necessarily reduces the
rent and profit of the land which grows it.
A tax upon the produce of those precious
vineyards, of which the wine falls so much
short of the effectual demand, that its price
is always above the natural proportion to that
of the produce of other equally fertile and
equally well cultivated land, would necessarily
reduce the rent and profit of those vineyards.
The price of the wines being already
the highest that could be got for the quantity
commonly sent to market, it could not be
raised higher without diminishing that quantity;
and the quantity could not be diminished
without still greater loss, because the
lands could not be turned to any other equally
valuable produce. The whole weight of
the tax, therefore, would fall upon the rent
and profit; properly upon the rent of the
vineyard. When it has been proposed to lay
any new tax upon sugar, our sugar planters
have frequently complained that the whole
weight of such taxes fell not upon the consumer,
but upon the producer; they never
having been able to raise the price of their
sugar after the tax higher than it was before.
The price had, it seems, before the tax, been
a monopoly price; and the arguments adduced
to show that sugar was an improper subject
of taxation, demonstrated perhaps that it
was a proper one; the gains of monopolists,
whenever they can be come at, being certainly
of all subjects the most proper. But the
ordinary price of barley has never been a monopoly
price; and the rent and profit of barley
land have never been above their natural
proportion to those of other equally fertile
and equally well cultivated land. The different
taxes which have been imposed upon
malt, beer, and ale, have never lowered the
price of barley; have never reduced the rent
and profit of barley land. The price of malt
to the brewer has constantly risen in proportion
to the taxes imposed upon it; and those
taxes, together with the different duties upon
beer and ale, have constantly either raised
the price, or, what comes to the same thing,
reduced the quality of those commodities to
the consumer. The final payment of those
taxes has fallen constantly upon the consumer,
and not upon the producer.
The only people likely to suffer by the
change of system here proposed, are those who
brew for their own private use. But the
exemption, which this superior rank of people
at present enjoy, from very heavy taxes which