perhaps, at present, the greater part of the
revenue which is drawn from the duties of
customs. The taxes which at present subsist
upon foreign manufactures, if you except
those upon the few contained in the foregoing
enumeration, have, the greater part of them,
been imposed for the purpose, not of revenue,
but of monopoly, or to give our own merchants
an advantage in the home market.
By removing all prohibitions, and by subjecting
all foreign manufactures to such moderate
taxes, as it was found from experience,
afforded upon each article the greatest revenue
to the public, our own workmen might still
have a considerable advantage in the home
market; and many articles, some of which at
present afford no revenue to government, and
others a very inconsiderable one, might afford
a very great one.
High taxes, sometimes by diminishing the
consumption of the taxed commodities, and
sometimes by encouraging smuggling, frequently
afford a smaller revenue to government
than what might be drawn from more
moderate taxes.
When the diminution of revenue is the effect
of the diminution of consumption, there
can be but one remedy, and that is the lowering
of the tax.
When the diminution of revenue is the effect
of the encouragement given to smuggling,
it may, perhaps, be remedied in two
ways; either by diminishing the temptation
to smuggle, or by increasing the difficulty of
smuggling. The temptation to smuggle can be
be diminished only by the lowering of the
tax; and the difficulty of smuggling can be
increased only by establishing that system of
administration which is most proper for preventing
it.
The excise laws, it appears, I believe, from
experience, obstruct and embarrass the operations
of the smuggler much more effectually
than those of the customs. By introducing
into the customs a system of administration
as similar to that of the excise as the nature
of the different duties will admit, the difficulty
of smuggling might be very much increased.
This alteration, it has been supposed
by many people, might very easily be brought
about.
The importer of commodities liable to any
duties of customs, it has been said, might, at
his option, he allowed either to carry them to
his own private warehouse; or to lodge them
in a warehouse, provided either at his own expense
or at that of the public, but under the
key of the custom-house officer, and never to
be opened but in his presence. If the merchant
carried them to his own private warehouse,
the duties to be immediately paid, and
never afterwards to be drawn back; and that
warehouse to be at all times subject to the
visit and examination of the custom-house officer,
in order to ascertain how far the quantity
contained in it corresponded with that for
which the duty had been paid. If he carried
them to the public warehouse, no duty to be
paid till they were taken out for home
consumption. If taken out for exportation, to
be duty-free; proper security being always
given that they should be so exported. The
dealers in those particular commodities, either
by wholesale or retail, to be at all times subject
to the visit and examination of the custom-house
officer; and to be obliged to justify,
by proper certificates, the payment of the
duty upon the whole quantity contained in
their shops or warehouses. What are called
the excise duties upon rum imported, are at
present levied in this manner; and the same
system of administration might, perhaps, be
extended to all duties upon goods imported;
provided always that those duties were, like
the duties of excise, confined to a few sorts of
goods of the most general use and consumption.
If they were extended to almost all
sorts of goods, as at present, public warehouses
of sufficient extent could not easily be
provided; and goods of a very delicate nature,
or of which the preservation required
much care and attention, could not safely be
trusted by the merchant in any warehouse but
his own.
If, by such a system of administration,
smuggling to any considerable extent could
be prevented, even under pretty high duties;
if every duty was occasionally either
heightened or lowered according as it was
likely, either the one way or the other,
to afford the greatest revenue to the state;
taxation being always employed as an instrument
of revenue, and never of monopoly; it
seems not improbable that a revenue, at least
equal to the present neat revenue of the customs,
might be drawn from duties upon the
importation of only a few sorts of goods of
the most general use and consumption; and
that the duties of customs might thus be
brought to the same degree of simplicity, certainty,
and precision, as those of excise.
What the revenue at present loses by drawbacks
upon the re-exportation of foreign
goods, which are afterwards re-landed and
consumed at home, would, under this system,
be saved altogether. If to this saving, which
would alone be very considerable, were added
the abolition of all bounties upon the exportation
of home produce; in all cases in which
those bounties were not in reality drawbacks
of some duties of excise which had before been
advanced; it cannot well be doubted, but that
the neat revenue of customs might, after an
alteration of this kind, be fully equal to what
it had ever been before.
If, by such a change of system, the public
revenue suffered no loss, the trade and manufactures
of the country would certainly gain
a very considerable advantage. The trade in
the commodities not taxed, by far the greatest