sells a future revenue of much greater value.
It is, in most cases, therefore, hurtful to the
landlord; it is frequently hurtful to the tenant;
and it is always hurtful to the community.
It frequently takes from the tenant so
great a part of his capital, and thereby diminishes
so much his ability to cultivate the
land, that he finds it more difficult to pay a
small rent than it would otherwise have been
to pay a great one. Whatever diminishes his
ability to cultivate, necessarily keeps down,
below what it would otherwise have been, the
most important part of the revenue of the community.
By rendering the tax upon such fines
a good deal heavier than upon the ordinary
rent, this hurtful practice might be discouraged,
to the no small advantage of all the
different parties concerned, of the landlord, of
the tenant, of the sovereign, and of the whole
community.
Some leases prescribe to the tenant a certain
mode of cultivation, and a certain succession
of crops, during the whole continuance
of the lease. This condition, which is generally
the effect of the landlord's conceit of his
own superior knowledge (a conceit in most
cases very ill-founded), ought always to be
considered as an additional rent, as a rent in
service, instead of a rent in money. In order
to discourage the practice, which is generally
a foolish one, this species of rent might
be valued rather high, and consequently taxed
somewhat higher than common money-rents.
Some landlords, instead of a rent in money,
require a rent in kind, in corn, cattle, poultry,
wine, oil, &c.; others, again, require a rent
in service. Such rents are always more hurtful
to the tenant than beneficial to the landlord.
They either take more, or keep more
out of the pocket of the former, than they
put into that of the latter. In every country
where they take place, the tenants are poor
and beggarly, pretty much according to the
degree in which they take place. By valuing,
in the same manner, such rents rather
high, and consequently taxing them somewhat
higher than common money-rents, a
practice which is hurtful to the whole community,
might, perhaps, be sufficiently discouraged.
When the landlord chose to occupy himself
a part of his own lands, the rent might be valued
according to an equitable arbitration of
the farmers and landlords in the neighbourhood,
and a moderate abatement of the tax
might be granted to him, in the same manner
as in the Venetian territory, provided the rent
of the lands which he occupied did not exceed
a certain sum. It is of importance that the
landlord should be encouraged to cultivate a
part of his own land. His capital is generally
greater than that of the tenant, and, with less
skill, he can frequently raise a greater produce.
The landlord can afford to try experiments,
and in generally disposed to do so.
His unsuccessful experiments occasion only a
moderate loss to himself. His successful ones
contribute to the improvement and better cultivation
of the whole country. It might be
of importance, however, that the abatement of
the tax should encourage him to cultivate to
a certain extent only. If the landlords should,
the greater part of them, be tempted to farm
the whole of their own lands, the country (instead
of sober and industrious tenants, who
are bound by their own interest to cultivate
as well as their capital and skill will allow
them) would be filled with idle and profligate
bailiffs, whose abusive management would
soon degrade the cultivation, and reduce the
annual produce of the land, to the diminution,
not only of the revenue of their masters,
but of the most important part of that of the
whole society.
Such a system of administration might,
perhaps, free a tax of this kind from any degree
of uncertainty, which could occasion either oppression
or inconveniency to the contributor;
and might, at the same time, serve to introduce
into the common management of land
such a plan of policy as might contribute a
good deal to the general improvement and
good cultivation of the country.
The expense of levying a land-tax, which
varied with every variation of the rent, would,
no doubt, be somewhat greater than that of
levying one which was always rated according
to a fixed valuation. Some additional expense
would necessarily be incurred, both by the
different register-offices which it would be
proper to establish in the different districts
of the country, and by the different valuations
which might occasionally be made of the lands
which the proprietor chose to occupy himself.
The expense of all this, however, might be
very moderate, and much below what is incurred
in the levying of many other taxes, which
afford a very inconsiderable revenue in comparison
of what might easily be drawn from a
tax of this kind.
The discouragement which a variable land-tax
of this kind might give to the improvement
of land, seems to be the most important
objection which can be made to it. The landlord
would certainly be less disposed to improve,
when the sovereign, who contributed
nothing to the expense, was to share in the
profit of the improvement. Even this objection
might, perhaps, be obviated, by allowing
the landlord, before he began his improvement,
to ascertain, in conjunction with the officers
of revenue, the actual value of his lands, according
to the equitable arbitration of a certain
number of landlords and farmers in the
neighbourhood, equally chosen by both parties:
and by rating him, according to this valuation,
for such a number of years as might
be fully sufficient for his complete indemnification.
To draw the attention of the sovereign
towards the improvement of the land,