It has been owing in part, to the great
prosperity of almost every part of the country,
the rents of almost all the estates of Great
Britain having, since the time when this valuation
was first established, been continually
rising, and scarce any of them having fallen.
The landlords, therefore, have almost all gained
the difference between the tax which they
would have paid, according to the present rent
of their estates, and that which they actually pay
according to the ancient valuation. Had the
state of the country been different, had rents
been gradually falling in consequence of the
declension of cultivation, the landlords would
almost all have lost this difference. In the
state of things which has happened to take
place since the revolution, the constancy of
the valuation has been advantageous to the
landlord and hurtful to the sovereign. In a
different state of things it might have been
advantageous to the sovereign and hurtful to
the landlord.
As the tax is made payable in money, so
the valuation of the land is expressed in money.
Since the establishment of this valuation, the
value of silver has been pretty uniform, and
there has been no alteration in the standard
of the coin, either as to weight or fineness.
Had silver risen considerably in its value, as
it seems to have done in the course of the
two centuries which preceded the discovery of
the mines of America, the constancy of the
valuation might have proved very oppressive
to the landlord. Had silver fallen considerably
in its value, as it certainly did for about
a century at least after the discovery of those
mines, the same constancy of valuation would
have reduced very much this branch of the
revenue of the sovereign. Had any considerable
alteration been made in the standard
of the money, either by sinking the same
quantity of silver to a lower denomination,
or by raising it to a higher; had an ounce of
silver, for example, instead of being coined
into five shillings and two pence, been coined
either into pieces which bore so low a denomination
as two shillings and seven pence, or
into pieces which bore so high a one as ten
shillings and four pence, it would, in the one
case, have hurt the revenue of the proprietor,
in the other that of the sovereign.
In circumstances, therefore, somewhat different
from those which have actually taken
place, this constancy of valuation might have
been a very great inconveniency, either to the
contributors or to the commonwealth. In
the course of ages, such circumstances, however,
must at some time or other happen. But
though empires, like all the other works of men,
have all hitherto proved mortal, yet every empire
aims at immortality. Every constitution,
therefore, which it is meant should be as permanent
as the empire itself, ought to be convenient,
not in certain circumstances only,
but in all circumstances; or ought to be
suited, not to those circumstances which are
transitory, occasional, or accidental, but to
those which are necessary, and therefore always
the same.
A tax upon the rent of land, which varies
with every variation of the rent, or which rises
and falls according to the improvement or
neglect of cultivation, is recommended by that
sect of men of letters in France, who call
themselves the economists, as the most equitable
of all taxes. All taxes, they pretend,
fall ultimately upon the rent of land, and
ought, therefore, to be imposed equally upon
the fund which must finally pay them. That
all taxes ought to fall as equally as possible
upon the fund which must finally pay them,
is certainly true. But without entering into
the disagreeable discussion of the metaphysical
arguments by which they support their
very ingenious theory, it will sufficiently appear,
from the following review, what are the
taxes which fall finally upon the rent of the
land, and what are those which fall finally upon
some other fund.
In the Venetian territory, all the arable
lands which are given in lease to farmers are
taxed at a tenth of the rent.[53] The leases are
recorded in a public register, which is kept
by the officers of revenue in each province or
district. When the proprietor cultivates his
own lands, they are valued according to an
equitable estimation, and he is allowed a deduction
of one-fifth of the tax; so that for
such land he pays only eight instead of ten
per cent. of the supposed rent.
A land-tax of this kind is certainly more
equal than the land-tax of England. It might
not, perhaps, be altogether so certain, and the
assessment of the tax might frequently occasion
a good deal more trouble to the landlord.
It might, too, be a good deal more expensive
in the levying.
Such a system of administration, however,
might, perhaps, be contrived, as would in a
great measure both prevent this uncertainty,
and moderate this expense.
The landlord and tenant, for example, might
jointly be obliged to record their lease in a
public register. Proper penalties might be
enacted against concealing or misrepresenting
any of the conditions; and if part of those
penalties were to be paid to either of the two
parties who informed against and convicted
the other of such concealment or misrepresentation,
it would effectually deter them from
combining together in order to defraud the
public revenue. All the conditions of the
lease might be sufficiently known from such a
record.
Some landlords, instead of raising the rent,
take a fine for the renewal of the lease. This
practice is, in most cases, the expedient of a
spendthrift, who, for a sum of ready money