from the duties of custom and excise, would
necessarily increase with the revenue and consumption
of the people.
The revenue which, in any civilized monarchy,
the crown derives from the crown
lands, though it appears to cost nothing to
individuals, in reality costs more to the society
than perhaps any other equal revenue
which the crown enjoys. It would, in all
cases, be for the interest of the society, to replace
this revenue to the crown by some other
equal revenue, and to divide the lands among
the people, which could not well be done better,
perhaps, than by exposing them to public
sale.
Lands, for the purposes of pleasure and
magnificence, parks, gardens, public walks,
&c. possessions which are everywhere considered
as causes of expense, not as sources of
revenue, seem to be the only lands which, in
a great and civilized monarchy, ought to belong
to the crown.
Public stock and public lands, therefore,
the two sources of revenue which may peculiarly
belong to the sovereign or commonwealth,
being both improper and insufficient
funds for defraying the necessary expense of
any great and civilized state; it remains that
this expense must, the greater part of it, be
defrayed by taxes of one kind or another;
the people contributing a part of their own
private revenue, in order to make up a public
revenue to the sovereign or commonwealth.
PART II.
Of Taxes.
The private revenue of individuals, it has
been shown in the first book of this Inquiry,
arises, ultimately from the three different sources;
rent, profit, and wages. Every tax must
finally be paid from some one or other of
those three different sources of revenue, or
from all of them indifferently. I shall endeavour
to give the best account I can, first,
of those taxes which, it is intended should fall
upon rent; secondly, of those which, it is
intended should fall upon profit; thirdly, of
those which, it is intended should fall upon
wages; and fourthly, of those which, it is intended
should fall indifferently upon all those
three different sources of private revenue.
The particular consideration of each of these
four different sources of taxes will divide the
second part of the present chapter into four
articles, three of which will require several
other subdivisions. Many of these taxes, it
will appear from the following review, are
not finally paid from the fund, or source of
revenue, upon which it is intended they should
fall.
Before I enter upon the examination of particular
taxes, it is necessary to premise the
four following maxims with regard to taxes in
general.
1. The subjects of every state ought to
contribute towards the support of the government,
as nearly as possible, in proportion to
their respective abilities; that is, in proportion
to the revenue which they respectively
enjoy under the protection of the state. The
expense of government to the individuals of
a great nation, is like the expense of management
to the joint tenants of a great estate,
who are all obliged to contribute in proportion
to their respective interests in the estate.
In the observation or neglect of this maxim,
consists what is called the equality or inequality
of taxation. Every tax, it must be observed
once for all, which falls finally upon
one only of the three sorts of revenue above
mentioned, is necessarily unequal, in so far
as it does not affect the other two. In the
following examination of different taxes, I
shall seldom take much farther notice of this
sort of inequality; but shall, in most cases,
confine my observations to that inequality
which is occasioned by a particular tax falling
unequally upon that particular sort of private
revenue which is affected by it.
2. The tax which each individual is bound
to pay, ought to be certain and not arbitrary.
The time of payment, the manner of payment,
the quantity to be paid, ought all to be clear
and plain to the contributor, and to every
other person. Where it is otherwise, every
person subject to the tax is put more or less in
the power of the tax-getherer, who can either
aggravate the tax upon any obnoxious contributor,
or extort, by the terror of such aggravation,
some present or perquisite to himself.
The uncertainty of taxation encourages the
insolence, and favours the corruption, of an
order of men who are naturally unpopular, even
where they are neither insolent nor corrupt.
The certainty of what each individual ought
to pay is, in taxation, a matter of so great importance,
that a very considerable degree of
inequality, it appears, I believe, from the experience
of all nations, is not near so great an
evil as a very small degree of uncertainty.
3. Every tax ought to be levied at the time,
or in the manner, in which it is most likely to
be convenient for the contributor to pay it. A
tax upon the rent of land or of houses, payable
at the same term at which such rents are usually
paid, is levied at the time when it is most
likely to be convenient for the contributor to
pay; or when he is most likely to have wherewithal
to pay. Taxes upon such consumable
goods as are articles of luxury, are all finally
paid by the consumer, and generally in a
manner that is very convenient for him. He
pays them by little and little, as he has occasion
to buy the goods. As he is at liberty
too, either to buy or not to buy, as he pleases,
it must be his own fault if he ever suffers any
considerable inconveniency from such taxes.