| The second of those remedies is the frequency | |||
| and gaiety of public diversions. The | |||
| state, by encouraging, that is, by giving entire | |||
| liberty to all those who, from their own | |||
| interest, would attempt, without scandal or | |||
| indecency, to amuse and divert the people | |||
| by painting, poetry, music, dancing; by all | |||
| sorts of dramatic representations and exhibitions; | |||
| would easily dissipate, in the greater | |||
| part of them, that melancholy and gloomy | |||
| humour which is almost always the nurse of | |||
| popular superstition and enthusiasm. Public | |||
| diversions have always been the objects of | |||
| dread and hatred to all the fanatical promoters | |||
| of those popular frenzies. The gaiety and | |||
| good humour which those diversions inspire, | |||
| were altogether inconsistent with that temper | |||
| of mind which was fittest for their purpose, | |||
| or which they could best work upon. Dramatic | |||
| representations, besides, frequently exposing | |||
| their artifices to public ridicule, and | |||
| sometimes even to public execration, were, | |||
| upon that account, more than all other diversions, | |||
| the objects of their peculiar abhorrence. | |||
| In a country where the law favoured the | |||
| teachers of no one religion more than those | |||
| of another, it would not be necessary that | |||
| any of them should have any particular or | |||
| immediate dependency upon the sovereign or | |||
| executive power; or that he should have any | |||
| thing to do either in appointing or in dismissing | |||
| them from their offices. In such a situation, | |||
| he would have no occasion to give | |||
| himself any concern about them, further than | |||
| to keep the peace among them, in the same | |||
| manner as among the rest of his subjects, | |||
| that is, to hinder them from persecuting, | |||
| abusing, or oppressing one another. But it | |||
| is quite otherwise in countries where there is | |||
| an established or governing religion. The | |||
| sovereign can in this case never be secure, | |||
| unless he has the means of influencing in a | |||
| considerable degree the greater part of the | |||
| teachers of that religion. | |||
| The clergy of every established church | |||
| constitute a great incorporation. They can | |||
| act in concert, and pursue their interest upon | |||
| one plan, and with one spirit as much as if | |||
| they were under the direction of one man; | |||
| and they are frequently, too, under such | |||
| direction. Their interest as an incorporated | |||
| body is never the same with that of the sovereign, | |||
| and is sometimes directly opposite to | |||
| it. Their great interest is to maintain their | |||
| authority with the people, and this authority | |||
| depends upon the supposed certainty and | |||
| importance of the whole doctrine which they | |||
| inculcate, and upon the supposed necessity | |||
| of adopting every part of it with the most implicit | |||
| faith, in order to avoid eternal misery. | |||
| Should the sovereign have the imprudence | |||
| to appear either to deride, or doubt himself | |||
| of the most trifling part of their doctrine, or | |||
| from humanity, attempt to protect those who | |||
| did either the one or the other, the punctilious | |||
| honour of a clergy, who have no sort of | |||
| dependency upon him, is immediately provoked | |||
| to proscribe him as a profane person, | |||
| and to employ all the terrors of religion, in | |||
| order to oblige the people to transfer their | |||
| allegiance to some more orthodox and obedient | |||
| prince. Should he oppose any of their | |||
| pretensions or usurpations, the danger is | |||
| equally great. The princes who have dared | |||
| in this manner to rebel against the church, | |||
| over and above this crime of rebellion, have | |||
| generally been charged, too, with the additional | |||
| crime of heresy, notwithstanding their | |||
| solemn protestations of their faith, and humble | |||
| submission to every tenet which she | |||
| thought proper to prescribe to them. But | |||
| the authority of religion is superior to every | |||
| other authority. The fears which it suggests | |||
| conquer all other fears. When the authorized | |||
| teachers of religion propagate through | |||
| the great body of the people, doctrines subversive | |||
| of the authority of the sovereign, it is | |||
| by violence only, or by the force of a standing | |||
| army, that he can maintain his authority. | |||
| Even a standing army cannot in this case give | |||
| him any lasting security; because if the soldiers | |||
| are not foreigners, which can seldom be | |||
| the case, but drawn from the great body of | |||
| the people, which must almost always be the | |||
| case, they are likely to be soon corrupted by | |||
| those very doctrines. The revolutions which | |||
| the turbulence of the Greek clergy was continually | |||
| occasioning at Constantinople, as | |||
| long as the eastern empire subsisted; the | |||
| convulsions which, during the course of several | |||
| centuries, the turbulence of the Roman | |||
| clergy was continually occasioning in every | |||
| part of Europe, sufficiently demonstrate how | |||
| precarious and insecure must always be the | |||
| situation of the sovereign, who has no proper | |||
| means of influencing the clergy of the established | |||
| and governing religion of his country. | |||
| Articles of faith, as well as all other spiritual | |||
| matters, it is evident enough, are not | |||
| within the proper department of a temporal | |||
| sovereign, who, though he may be very well | |||
| qualified for protecting, is seldom supposed | |||
| to be so for instructing the people. With | |||
| regard to such matters, therefore, his authority | |||
| can seldom be sufficient to counterbalance | |||
| the united authority of the clergy of the established | |||
| church. The public tranquillity, | |||
| however, and his own security, may frequently | |||
| depend upon the doctrines which | |||
| they may think proper to propagate concerning | |||
| such matters. As he can seldom directly oppose | |||
| their decision, therefore, with proper weight | |||
| and authority, it is necessary that he should | |||
| be able to influence it; and he can influence | |||
| it only by the fears and expectations which | |||
| he may excite in the greater part of the individuals | |||
| of the order. Those fears and expectations | |||