three other joint-stock companies successively
established, one after another, for the African
trade. They were all equally unsuccessful.
They all, however, had exclusive charters,
which, though not confirmed by act of parliament,
were in those days supposed to convey
a real exclusive privilege.
The Hudson's Bay company, before their
misfortunes in the late war, had been much
more fortunate than the Royal African company.
Their necessary expense is much smaller.
The whole number of people whom they
maintain in their different settlements and habitations,
which they have honoured with the
name of forts, is said not to exceed a hundred
and twenty persons. This number, however,
is sufficient to prepare beforehand the
cargo of furs and other goods necessary for
loading their ships, which, on account of the
ice, can seldom remain above six or eight
weeks in those seas. This advantage of having
a cargo ready prepared, could not, for several
years, be acquired by private adventurers;
and without it there seems to be no possibility
of trading to Hudson's Bay. The
moderate capital of the company, which, it is
said, does not exceed one hundred and ten
thousand pounds, may, besides, be sufficient
to enable them to engross the whole, or almost
the whole trade and surplus produce, of the
miserable though extensive country comprehended
within their charter. No private adventurers,
accordingly, have ever attempted
to trade to that country in competition with
them. This company, therefore, have always
enjoyed an exclusive trade, in fact, though
they may have no right to it in law. Over
and above all this, the moderate capital of this
company is said to be divided among a very
small number of proprietors. But a joint-stock
company, consisting of a small number
of proprietors, with a moderate capital, approaches
very nearly to the nature of a private
copartnery, and may be capable of nearly
the same degree of vigilance and attention.
It is not to be wondered at, therefore, if, in
consequence of these different advantages, the
Hudson's Bay company had, before the late
war, been able to carry on their trade with a
considerable degree of success. It does not
seem probable, however, that their profits ever
approached to what the late Mr Dobbs imagined
them. A much more sober and judicious
writer, Mr Anderson, author of the Historical
and Chronological Deduction of Commerce,
very justly observes, that upon examining
the accounts which Mr Dobbs himself
has given for several years together, of their
exports and imports, and upon making proper
allowances for their extraordinary risk and
expense, it does not appear that their profits
deserve to be envied, or that they can much,
if at all, exceed the ordinary profits of trade.
The South Sea company never had any forts
or garrisons to maintain, and therefore were
entirely exempted from one great expense, to
which other joint-stock companies for foreign
trade are subject; but they had an immense
capital divided among an immense number of
proprietors. It was naturally to be expected,
therefore, that folly, negligence, and profusion,
should prevail in the whole management
of their affairs. The knavery and extravagance
of their stock-jobbing projects are sufficiently
known, and the explication of them
would be foreign to the present subject. Their
mercantile projects were not much better conducted.
The first trade which they engaged
in, was that of supplying the Spanish West
Indies with negroes, of which (in consequence
of what was called the Assiento Contract granted
them by the treaty of Utrecht) they had
the exclusive privilege. But as it was not
expected that much profit could be made by
this trade, both the Portuguese and French
companies, who had enjoyed it upon the same
terms before them, having been ruined by it,
they were allowed, as compensation, to send
annually a ship of a certain burden, to trade
directly to the Spanish West Indies. Of the
ten voyages which this annual ship was allowed
to make, they are said to have gained considerably
by one, that of the Royal Caroline, in
1731; and to have been losers, more or less,
by almost all the rest. Their ill success was
imputed, by their factors and agents, to the
extortion and oppression of the Spanish government;
but was, perhaps, principally owing
to the profusion and depredations of those very
factors and agents; some of whom are said to
have acquired great fortunes, even in one year.
In 1734, the company petitioned the king, that
they might be allowed to dispose of the trade
and tonnage of their annual ship, on account
of the little profit which they made by it, and
to accept of such equivalent as they could obtain
from the king of Spain.
In 1724, this company had undertaken the
whale fishery. Of this, indeed, they had no
monopoly; but as long as they carried it on,
no other British subjects appear to have engaged
in it. Of the eight voyages which their
ships made to Greenland, they were gainers
by one, and losers by all the rest. After their
eighth and last voyage, when they had sold
their ships, stores, and utensils, they found
that their whole loss upon this branch, capital
and interest included, amounted to upwards
of two hundred and thirty-seven thousand
pounds.
In 1722, this company petitioned the parliament
to be allowed to divide their immense
capital of more than thirty-three millions eight
hundred thousand pounds, the whole of which
been lent to government, into two equal
parts; the one half, or upwards of sixteen
millions nine hundred thousand pounds, to be
put upon the same footing with other government
annuities, and not to be subject to the
debts contracted, or losses incurred, by the