By this constitution, it might have been
expected, that the spirit of monopoly would
have been effectually restrained, and the first
of these purposes sufficiently answered. It
would seem, however, that it had not. Though
by the 4th of George III. c. 20, the fort of
Senegal, with all its dependencies, had been
invested in the company of merchants trading
to Africa, yet, in the year following (by the
5th of George III. c. 44), not only Senegal
and its dependencies, but the whole coast,
from the port of Sallee, in South Barbary, to
Cape Rouge, was exempted from the jurisdiction
of that company, was vested in the crown,
and the trade to it declared free to all his majesty's
subjects. The company had been suspected
of restraining the trade and of establishing
some sort of improper monopoly. It
is not, however, very easy to conceive how,
under the regulations of the 23d George II.
they could do so. In the printed debates of
the house of commons, not always the most
authentic records of truth, I observe, however,
that they have been accused of this.
The members of the committee of nine being
all merchants, and the governors and factors
in their different forts and settlements being
all dependent upon them, it is not unlikely
that the latter might have given peculiar attention
to the consignments and commissions
of the former, which would establish a real
monopoly.
For the second of these purposes, the maintenance
of the forts and garrisons, an annual
sum has been allotted to them by parliament,
generally about L.13,000. For the proper
application of this sum, the committee is
obliged to account annually to the cursitor
baron of exchequer; which account is afterwards
to be laid before parliament. But parliament,
which gives so little attention to the
application of millions, is not likely to give
much to that of L.13,000 a-year; and the
cursitor baron of exchequer, from his profession
and education, is not likely to be profoundly
skilled in the proper expense of forts
and garrisons. The captains of his majesty's
navy, indeed, or any other commissioned officers,
appointed by the board of admiralty,
may inquire into the condition of the forts and
garrisons, and report their observations to that
board. But that board seems to have no direct
jurisdiction over the committee, nor any
authority to correct those whose conduct it
may thus inquire into; and the captains of
his majesty's navy, besides, are not supposed
to be always deeply learned in the science of
fortification. Removal from an office, which
can be enjoyed only for the term of three
years, and of which the lawful emoluments,
even during that term, are so very small,
seems to be the utmost punishment to which
any committee-man is liable, for any fault,
except direct malversation, or embezzlement,
either of the public money, or of that of the
company; and the fear of the punishment can
never be a motive of sufficient weight to force
a continual and careful attention to a business
to which he has no other interest to attend.
The committee are accused of having
sent out bricks and stones from England for
the reparation of Cape Coast Castle, on the
coast of Guinea; a business for which parliament
had several times granted an extraordinary
sum of money. These bricks and stones,
too, which had thus been sent upon so long a
voyage, were said to have been of so bad a
quality, that it was necessary to rebuild, from
the foundation, the walls which had been repaired
with them. The forts and garrisons
which lie north of Cape Rouge, are not only
maintained at the expense of the state, but are
under the immediate government of the executive
power; and why those which lie south
of that cape, and which, too, are, in part at
least, maintained at the expense of the state,
should be under a different government, it
seems not very easy even to imagine a good
reason. The protection of the Mediterranean
trade was the original purpose or pretence of
the garrisons of Gibraltar and Minorca; and
the maintenance and government of those garrisons
have always been, very properly, committed,
not to the Turkey company, but to
the executive power. In the extent of its dominion
consists, in a great measure, the pride
and dignity of that power; and it is not very
likely to fail in attention to what is necessary
for the defence of that dominion. The garrisons
at Gibraltar and Minorca, accordingly,
have never been neglected. Though Minorca
has been twice taken, and is now probably
lost for ever, that disaster has never been imputed
to any neglect in the executive power.
I would not, however, be understood to insinuate,
that either of those expensive garrisons
was ever, even in the smallest degree, necessary
for the purpose for which they were originally
dismembered from the Spanish monarchy.
That dismemberment, perhaps, never
served any other real purpose than to alienate
from England her natural ally the king of
Spain, and to unite the two principal branches
of the house of Bourbon in a much stricter
and more permanent alliance than the ties of
blood could ever have united them.
Joint-stock companies, established either by
royal charter, or by act of parliament, are different
in several respects, not only from regulated
companies, but from private copartneries.
First, In a private copartnery, no partner
without the consent of the company, can
transfer his share to another person, or introduce
a new member into the company. Each
member, however, may, upon proper warning,
withdraw from the copartnery, and demand
payment from them of his share of the common
stock. In a joint-stock company, on
the contrary, no member can demand payment