subjects of conversation at the court and in
the capital, are attended to, and all the rest
neglected. In China, besides, in Indostan,
and in several other governments of Asia,
the revenue of the sovereign arises almost altogether
from a land tax or land rent, which
rises or falls with the rise and fall of the
annual produce of the land. The great interest
of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue,
is in such countries necessarily and immediately
connected with the cultivation of the
land, with the greatness of its produce, and
with the value of its produce. But in order
to render that produce both as great and as
valuable as possible, it is necessary to procure
to it as extensive a market as possible, and
consequently to establish the freest, the
easiest, and the least expensive communication
between all the different parts of the
country; which can be done only by means
of the best roads and the best navigable canals.
But the revenue of the sovereign does
not, in any part of Europe, arise chiefly from
a land tax or land rent. In all the great
kingdoms of Europe, perhaps, the greater
part of it may ultimately depend upon the
produce of the land: but that dependency is
neither so immediate nor so evident. In
Europe, therefore, the sovereign does not feel
himself so directly called upon to promote
the increase, both in quantity and value of the
produce of the land, or, by maintaining good
roads and canals, to provide the most extensive
market for that produce. Though it
should be true, therefore, what I apprehend
is not a little doubtful, that in some parts of
Asia this department of the public police is
very properly managed by the executive
power, there is not the least probability that,
during the present state of things, it could be
tolerably managed by that power in any part
of Europe.
Even those public works, which are of
such a nature that they cannot afford any revenue
for maintaining themselves, but of
which the conveniency is nearly confined to
some particular place or district, are always
better maintained by a local or provincial revenue,
under the management of a local and
provincial administration, than by the general
revenue of the state, of which the executive
power must always have the management.
Were the streets of London to be lighted and
paved at the expense of the treasury, is there
any probability that they would be so well
lighted and paved as they are at present, or
even at so small an expense? The expense,
besides, instead of being raised by a local tax
upon the inhabitants of each particular street,
parish, or district in London, would, in this
case, be defrayed out of the general revenue
of the state, and would consequently be raised
by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the
kingdom, of whom the greater part derive no
sort of benefit from the lighting and paving of
the streets of London.
The abuses which sometimes creep into the
local and provincial administration of a local
and provincial revenue, how enormous soever
they may appear, are in reality, however, almost
always very trifling in comparison of
those which commonly take place in the administration
and expenditure of the revenue
of a great empire. They are, besides, much
more easily corrected. Under the local or
provincial administration of the justices of
the peace in Great Britain, the six days labour
which the country people are obliged to
give to the reparation of the highways, is not
always, perhaps, very judiciously applied, but
it is scarce ever exacted with any circumstance
of cruelty or oppression. In France,
under the administration of the intendants,
the application is not always more judicious,
and the exaction is frequently the most cruel
and oppressive. Such corvees, as they are
called, make one of the principal instruments
of tyranny by which these officers chastise any
parish or communeaute, which has had the
misfortune to fall under their displeasure.
Of the public Works and Institutions which are
necessary for facilitating particular Branches
of Commerce.
The object of the public works and institutions
above mentioned, is to facilitate commerce
in general. But in order to facilitate
some particular branches of it, particular institutions
are necessary, which again require
a particular and extraordinary expense.
Some particular branches of commerce
which are carried on with barbarous and uncivilized
nations, require extraordinary protection.
An ordinary store or counting-house
could give little security to the goods
of the merchants who trade to the western
coast of Africa. To defend them from the
barbarous natives, it is necessary that the
place where they are deposited should be in
same measure fortified. The disorders in
the government of Indostan have been supposed
to render a like precaution necessary,
even among that mild and gentle people;
and it was under pretence of securing their
persons and property from violence, that both
the English and French East India companies
were allowed to erect the first forts
which they possessed in that country. Among
other nations, whose vigorous government
will suffer no strangers to possess any fortified
place within their territory, it may be necessary
to maintain some ambassador, minister,
or consul, who may both decide,
according to their own customs, the differences
arising among his own countrymen;
and, in their disputes with the natives, may