ART. I.—Of the public Works and Institutions
for facilitating the Commerce of the Society.
And, first, of those which are necessary for
facilitating Commerce in general.
That the erections and maintenance of the
public works which facilitate the commerce
of any country, such as good roads, bridges,
navigable canals, harbours, &c. must require
very different degrees of expense in the different
periods of society, is evident without
any proof. The expense of making and
maintaining the public roads of any country
must evidently increase with the annual produce
of the land and labour of that country,
or with the quantity and weight of the goods
which it becomes necessary to fetch and carry
upon those roads. The strength of a bridge
must be suited to the number and weight of
the carriages which are likely to pass over it.
The depth and the supply of water for a navigable
canal must be proportional to the
number and tonnage of the lighters which
are likely to carry goods upon it; the extent
of a harbour, to the number of the shipping
which are likely to take shelter in it.
It does not seem necessary that the expense
of those public works should be defrayed
from that public revenue, as it is commonly
called, of which the collection and application
are in most countries, assigned to the
executive power. The greater part of such
public works may easily be so managed, as to
afford a particular revenue, sufficient for defraying
their own expense, without bringing
any burden upon the general revenue of the
society.
A highway, a bridge, a navigable canal, for
example, may, in most cases, be both made
and maintained by a small toll upon the carriages
which make use of them; a harbour,
by a moderate port-duty upon the tonnage of
the shipping which load or unload in it.
The coinage, another institution for facilitating
commerce, in many countries, not only
defrays its own expense, but affords a small
revenue or a seignorage to the sovereign.
The post-office, another institution for the same
purpose, over and above defraying its own
expense, affords, in almost all countries, a
very considerable revenue to the sovereign.
When the carriages which pass over a highway
or a bridge, and the lighters which sail
upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion
to their weight or their tonnage, they pay for
the maintenance of these public works exactly
in proportion to the wear and tear which they
occasion of them. It seems scarce possible
to invent a more equitable way of maintaining
such works. This tax or toll, too, though
it is advanced by the carrier, is finally paid
by the consumer, to whom it must always be
charged in the price of the goods. As the
expense of carriage, however, is very much
reduced by means of such public works, the
goods, notwithstanding the toll, come cheaper
to the consumer than they could otherwise
have done, their price not being so much raised
by the toll, as it is lowered by the cheapness
of the carriage. The person who finally
pays this tax, therefore, gains by the application
more than he loses by the payment of
it. His payment is exactly in proportion to
his gain. It is, in reality, no more than a
part of that gain which he is obliged to give
up, in order to get the rest. It seems impossible
to imagine a more equitable method
of raising a tax.
When the toll upon carriages of luxury,
upon coaches, post-chaises, &c. is made
somewhat higher in proportion to their
weight, than upon carriages of necessary use,
such as carts, waggons, &c. the indolence and
vanity of the rich is made to contribute, in a
very easy manner, to the relief of the poor,
by rendering cheaper the transportation of
heavy goods to all the different parts of the
country.
When high-roads, bridges, canals, &c. are
in this manner made and supported by the
commerce which is carried on by means of
them, they can be made only where that
commerce requires them, and, consequently,
where it is proper to make them, Their expense,
too, their grandeur and magnificence,
must be suited to what that commerce can
afford to pay. They must be made, consequently,
as it is proper to make them. A
magnificent high-road cannot be made through
a desert country, where there is little or no
commerce, or merely because it happens to
lead to the country villa of the intendant of
the province, or to that of some great lord,
to whom the intendant finds it convenient to
make his court. A great bridge cannot be
thrown over a river at a place where nobody
passes, or merely to embellish the view from
the windows of a neighbouring palace; things
which sometimes happen in countries, where
works of this kind are carried on by any other
revenue than that which they themselves are
capable of affording.
In several different parts of Europe, the
toll or lock-duty upon a canal is the property
of private persons, whose private interest
obliges them to keep up the canal. If it is
not kept in tolerable order, the navigation
necessarily ceases altogether, and, along with
it, the whole profit which they can make by
the tolls. If those tolls were put under the
the management of commissioners, who had
themselves no interest in them, they might
be less attentive to the maintenance of the
works which produced them. The canal of
Languedoc cost the king of France and the
province upwards of thirteen millions of livres,
which (at twenty-eight livres the mark of silver,