country can be perpetuated, or even preserved,
for any considerable time.
As it is only by means of a well regulated
standing army, that a civilized country can
be defended, so it is only by means of it that
a barbarous country can be suddenly and tolerably
civilised. A standing army establishes,
with an irresistible force, the law
of the sovereign through the remotest provinces
of the empire, and maintains some degree
of regular government in countries
which could not otherwise admit of any.
Whoever examines with attention, the improvements
which Peter the Great introduced
into the Russian empire, will find that they
almost all resolve themselves into the establishment
of a well regulated standing army.
It is the instrument which executes and maintains
all his other regulations. That degree
of order and internal peace, which that empire
has ever since enjoyed, is altogether owing
to the influence of that army.
Men of republican principles have been
jealous of a standing army, as dangerous to
liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the interest
of the general, and that of the principal
officers, are not necessarily connected with
the support of the constitution of the state.
The standing army of Cæsar destroyed the
Roman republic. The standing army of
Cromwell turned the long parliament out of
doors. But where the sovereign is himself
the general, and the principal nobility and
gentry of the country the chief officers of the
army; where the military force is placed under
the command of those who have the
greatest interest in the support of the civil
authority, because they have themselves the
greatest share of that authority, a standing
army can never be dangerous to liberty. On
the contrary, it may, in some cases, be favourable
to liberty. The security which it
gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary
that troublesome jealousy, which, in some
modern republics, seems to watch over the
minutest actions, and to be at all times ready
to disturb the peace of every citizen. Where
the security of the magistrate, though supported
by the principal people of the country,
is endangered by every popular discontent;
where a small tumult is capable of bringing
about in a few hours a great revolution, the
whole authority of government must be employed
to suppress and punish every murmur
and complaint against it. To a sovereign,
on the contrary, who feels himself supported,
not only by the natural aristocracy of the
country, but by a well regulated standing
army, the rudest, the most groundless, and
the must licentious remonstrances, can give
little disturbance. He can safely pardon or
neglect them, and his consciousness of his
own superiority naturally disposes him to do
so. That degree of liberty which approaches
to licentiousness, can be tolerated only in
countries where the sovereign is secured by a
well regulated standing army. It is in such
countries only, that the public safety does
not require that the sovereign should be trusted
with any discretionary power, for suppressing
even the impertinent wantonness of this
licentious liberty.
The first duty of the sovereign, therefore,
that of defending the society from the violence
and injustice of other independent societies,
grows gradually more and more expensive,
as the society advances in civilization.
The military force of the society,
which originally cost the sovereign no expense,
either in time of peace, or in time of
war, must, in the progress of improvement,
first be maintained by him in time of war,
and afterwards even in time of peace.
The great change introduced into the art
of war by the invention of fire-arms, has enhanced
still further both the expense of exercising
and disciplining any particular number
of soldiers in time of peace, and that of employing
them in time of war. Both their
arms and their ammunition are become more
expensive. A musket is a more expensive
machine than a javelin or a bow and arrows;
a cannon or a mortar, than a balista or a catapulta.
The powder which is spent in a
modern review is lost irrecoverably, and occasions
a very considerable expense. The
javelins and arrows which were thrown or
shot in an ancient one, could easily be picked
up again, and were, besides, of very little
value. The cannon and the mortar are not
only much dearer, but much heavier machines
than the balista or catapulta; and require a
greater expense, not only to prepare them for
the field, but to carry them to it. As the
superiority of the modern artillery, too, over
that of the ancients, is very grant; it has become
much more difficult, and consequently
much more expensive, to fortify a town, so
as to resist, even for a few weeks, the attack
of that superior artillery. In modern times,
many different causes contribute to render the
defence of the society more expensive. The
unavoidable effects of the natural progress of
improvement have, in this respect, been a
good deal enhanced by a great revolution in
the the art of war, to which a mere accident, the
invention of gunpowder, seems to have given
occasion.
In modern war, the great expense of fire-arms
gives an evident advantage to the nation
which can best afford that expense; and
consequently, to an opulent and civilized,
over a poor and barbarous nation. In ancient
times, the opulent and civilized found
it difficult to defend themselves against the
poor and barbarous nations. In modern
times, the poor and barbarous find it difficult
to defend themselves against the opulent and