One of the first standing armies, of which
we have any distinct account in any well
authenticated history, is that of Philip of
Macedon. His frequent wars with the Thracians,
Illyrians, Thessalians, and some of the
Greek cities in the neighbourhood of Macedon,
gradually formed his troops, which in
the beginning were probably militia, to the
exact discipline of a standing army. When
he was at peace, which he was very seldom,
and never for any long time together, he was
careful not to disband that army. It vanquished
and subdued, after a long and violent
struggle, indeed, the gallant and well
exercised militias of the principal republics
of ancient Greece; and afterwards, with very
little struggle, the effeminate and ill exercised
militia of the great Persian empire. The
fall of the Greek republics, and of the Persian
empire was the effect of the irresistible
superiority which a standing army has over
every other sort of militia. It is the first
great revolution in the affairs of mankind of
which history has preserved any distinct and
circumstantial account.
The fall of Carthage, and the consequent
elevation of Rome, is the second. All the
varieties in the fortune of those two famous
republics may very well be accounted for from
the same cause.
From the end of the first to the beginning
of the second Carthaginian war, the armies
of Carthage were continually in the field, and
employed under three great generals, who
succeeded one another in the command;
Amilcar, his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his
son Annibal: first in chastising their own
rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing the
revolted nations of Africa; and lastly, in
conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The
army which Annibal led from Spain into
Italy must necessarily, in those different
wars, have been gradually formed to the
exact discipline of standing army. The
Romans, in the meantime, though they had
not been altogether at peace, yet they had
not, during this period, been engaged in any
war of very great consequence; and their
military discipline, it is generally said, was a
good deal relaxed. The Roman armies
which Annibal encountered at Trebi, Thrasymenus,
and Cannæ, were militia opposed to
a standing army. This circumstance, it is
probable, contributed more than any other to
determine the fate of those battles.
The standing army which Annibal left
behind him in Spain had the like superiority
over the militia which the Romans sent to
oppose it; and, in a few years, under the
command of his brother, the younger Asdrubal,
expelled them almost entirely from
that country.
Annibal was ill supplied from home. The
Roman militia, being continually in the field,
became, in the progress of the war, a well
disciplined and well exercised standing army;
and the superiority of Annibal grew every
day less and less. Asdrubal judged it necessary
to lead the whole, or almost the
whole, of the standing army which he commanded
in Spain, to the assistance of his
brother in Italy. In this march, he is said
to have been misled by his guides; and in a
country which he did not know, was surprised
and attacked, by another standing
army, in every respect equal or superior to
his own, and was entirely defeated.
When Asdrubal had left Spain, the great
Scipio found nothing to oppose him but a
militia inferior to his own. He conquered
and subdued that militia, and, in the course
of the war, his own militia necessarily became
a well disciplined and well exercised standing
army. That standing army was afterwards
carried to Africa, where it found nothing but
a militia to oppose it. In order to defend
Carthage, it became necessary to recal the
standing army of Annibal. The disheartened
and frequently defeated African militia joined
it, and, at the battle of Zama, composed the
greater part of the troops of Annibal. The
event of that day determined the fate of the
two rival republics.
From the end of the second Carthaginian
war till the fall of the Roman republic, the
armies of Rome were in every respect standing
armies. The standing army of Macedon
made some resistance to their arms. In the
height of their grandeur, it cost them two
great wars, and three great battles, to subdue
that little kingdom, of which the conquest
would probably have been still more difficult,
had it not been for the cowardice of its last
king. The militias of all the civilized nations
of the ancient word, of Greece, of Syria,
and of Egypt, made but a feeble resistance
to the standing armies of Rome. The militias
of some barbarous nations defended
themselves much better. The Scythian or
Tartar militia, which Mithridates drew from
the countries north of the Euxine and Caspian
seas, were the most formidable enemies
whom the Romans had to encounter after the
second Carthaginian war. The Parthian and
German militias, too, were always respectable,
and upon several occasions, gained very considerable
advantages over the Roman armies.
In general, however, and when the Roman
armies were well commanded, they appear to
have been very much superior; and if the
Romans did not pursue the final conquest
either of Parthia or Germany, it was probably
because they judged that it was not worth
while to add those two barbarous countries to
an empire which was already too large. The
ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation
of Scythian or Tartar extraction, and to
have always retained a good deal of the manners
of their ancestors. The ancient Germans
were, like the Scythians or Tartars, a