to establish in their own favour the
monopoly of some of the most important
branches, not only of the foreign, but of the
inland trade of the country. Had they been
allowed to go on, it is impossible that they
should not, at some time or another, have attempted
to restrain the production of the particular
articles of which they had thus usurped
the monopoly, not only to the quantity which
they themselves could purchase, but to that
which they could expect to sell with such a
profit as they might think sufficient. In the
course of a century or two, the policy of the
English company would, in this manner, have
probably proved as completely destructive as
that of the Dutch.
Nothing, however, can be more directly
contrary to the real interest of those companies,
considered as the sovereigns of the
countries which they have conquered, than
this destructive plan. In almost all countries,
the revenue of the sovereign is drawn
from that of the people. The greater the
revenue of the people, therefore, the greater
the annual produce of their land and labour,
the more they can afford to the sovereign. It
is his interest, therefore, to increase as much
as possible that annual produce. But if this
is the interest of every sovereign, it is peculiarly
so of one whose revenue, like that of
the sovereign of Bengal, arises chiefly from a
land-rent. That rent must necessarily be in
proportion to the quantity and value of the
produce; and both the one and the other
must depend upon the extent of the market.
The quantity will always be suited, with
more or less exactness, to the consumption of
those who can afford to pay for it; and the
price which they will pay will always be in proportion
to the eagerness of their competition.
It is the interest of such a sovereign, therefore,
to open the most extensive market for
the produce of his country, to allow the most
perfect freedom of commerce, in order to increase
as much as possible the number and
competition of buyers; and upon this account
to abolish, not only all monopolies, but all
restraints upon the transportation of the home
produce from one part of the country to
another, upon its exportation to foreign countries,
or upon the importation of goods of
any kind for which it can be exchanged. He
is in this manner most likely to increase both
the quantity and value of that produce, and
consequently of his own share of it, or of his
own revenue.
But a company of merchants, are, it seems,
incapable of considering themselves as sovereigns,
even after they have become such.
Trade, or buying in order to sell again, they
still consider as their principal business, and
by a strange absurdity, regard the character
of the sovereign as but an appendix to that of
the merchant; as something which ought to
be made subservient to it, or by means of
which they may be enabled to buy cheaper in
India, and thereby to sell with a better profit
in Europe. They endeavour, for this purpose,
to keep out as much as possible all
competitors from the market of the countries
which are subject to their government, and
consequently to reduce, at least, some part of
the surplus produce of those countries to what
is barely sufficient for supplying their own
demand, or to what they can expect to sell in
Europe, with such a profit as they may think
reasonable. Their mercantile habits draw them
in this manner, almost necessarily, though
perhaps insensibly, to prefer, upon all ordinary
occasions, the little and transitory profit
of the monopolist to the great and permanent
revenue of the sovereign; and would gradually
lead them to treat the countries subject
to their government nearly as the Dutch
treat the Moluccas. It is the interest of the
East India company, considered as sovereigns,
that the European goods which are carried to
their Indian dominions should be sold there
as cheap as possible; and that the Indian
goods which are brought from thence should
bring there as good a price, or should be sold
there as dear as possible. But the reverse
of this is their interest as merchants. As
sovereigns, their interest is exactly the same
with that of the country which they govern.
As merchants, their interest is directly opposite
to that interest.
But if the genius of such a government,
even as to what concerns its direction in Europe,
is in this manner essentially, and perhaps
incurably faulty, that of its administration
in India is still more so. That administration
is necessarily composed of a council
of merchants, a profession no doubt extremely
respectable, but which in no country in the
world carries along with it that sort of authority
which naturally overawes the people, and
without force commands their willing obedience.
Such a council can command obedience
only by the military force with which
they are accompanied; and their government
is, therefore, necessarily military and despotical.
Their proper business, however, is that
of merchants. It is to sell, upon their
master's account, the European goods consigned
to them, and to buy, in return, Indian goods
for the European market. It is to sell the
one as dear, and to buy the other as cheap as
possible, and consequently to exclude, as
much as possible, all rivals from the particular
market where they keep their shop. The
genius of the administration, therefore, so
far as concerns the trade of the company, is
the same as that of the direction. It tends
to make government subservient to the interest
of monopoly, and consequently to stunt
the natural growth of some parts, at least, of
the surplus produce of the country, to what
is barely sufficient for answering the demand
of the company.