magnifying events, in which they flattered
themselves they had been considerable actors.
How obstinately the city of Paris, upon that
occasion, defended itself, what a dreadful famine
it supported, rather than submit to the
best, and afterwards the most beloved of all
the French kings, is well known. The greater
part of the citizens, or those who governed the
greater part of them, fought in defence of
their own importance, which, they foresaw,
was to be at an end whenever the ancient government
should be re-established. Our colonies,
unless they can be induced to consent
to a union, are very likely to defend themselves,
against the best of all mother countries,
as obstinately as the city of Paris did against
one of the best of kings.
The idea of representation was unknown in
ancient times. When the people of one state
were admitted to the right of citizenship in
another, they had no other means of exercising
that right, but by coming in a body to
vote and deliberate with the people of that
other state. The admission of the greater part
of the inhabitants of Italy to the privileges of
Roman citizens, completely ruined the Roman
republic. It was no longer possible to
distinguish between who was, and who was
not, a Roman citizen. No tribe could know
its own members. A rabble of any kind could
be introduced into the assemblies of the people,
could drive out the real citizens, and decide
upon the affairs of the republic, as if they
themselves had been such. But though America
were to send fifty or sixty new representatives
to parliament, the door-keeper of the
house of commons could not find any great
difficulty in distinguishing between who was
and who was not a member. Though the Roman
constitution, therefore, was necessarily
ruined by the union of Rome with the allied
states of Italy, there is not the least probability
that the British constitution would be hurt
by the union of Great Britain with her colonies.
That constitution, on the contrary,
would be completed by it, and seems to be
imperfect without it. The assembly which deliberates
and decides concerning the affairs of
every part of the empire, in order to be properly
informed, ought certainly to have representatives
from every part of it. That this
union, however, could be easily effectuated,
or that difficulties, and great difficulties, might
not occur in the execution, I do not pretend.
I have yet heard of none, however, which appear
insurmountable. The principal, perhaps,
arise, not from the nature of things, but
from the prejudices and opinions of the people,
both on this and on the other side of the
Atlantic.
We on this side of the water are afraid lest
the multitude of American representatives
should overturn the balance of the constitution,
and increase too much either the influence
of the crown on the one hand, or the
force of the democracy on the other. But if
the number of American representatives were
to be in proportion to the produce of American
taxation, the number of people to be managed
would increase exactly in proportion to
the means of managing them, and the means
of managing to the number of people to be
managed. The monarchical and democratical
parts of the constitution would, after the union,
stand exactly in the same degree of relative
force with regard to one another as they had
done before.
The people on the other side of the water
are afraid lest their distance from the seat of
government might expose them to many oppressions;
but their representatives in parliament,
of which the number ought from the
first to be considerable, would easily be able
to protect them from all oppression. The distance
could not much weaken the dependency
of the representative upon the constituent, and
the former would still feel that he owed his
seat in parliament, and all the consequence
which he derived from it, to the good-will of
the latter. It would be the interest of the former,
therefore, to cultivate that good-will, by
complaining, with all the authority of a member
of the legislature, of every outrage which
any civil or military officer might be guilty of
in those remote parts of the empire. The distance
of America from the seat of government,
besides, the natives of that country might flatter
themselves, with some appearance of reason
too, would not be of very long continuance.
Such has hitherto been the rapid progress
of that country in wealth, population,
and improvement, that in the course of little
more than a century, perhaps, the produce of
the American might exceed that of the British
taxation. The seat of the empire would
then naturally remove itself to that part of the
empire which contributed most to the general
defence and support of the whole.
The discovery of America, and that of a
passage to the East Indies by the Cape of
Good Hope, are the two greatest and most
important events recorded in the history of
mankind. Their consequences have already
been great; but, in the short period of between
two and three centuries which has
elapsed since these discoveries were made, it
is impossible that the whole extent of their
consequences can have been seen. What benefits
or what misfortunes to mankind may
hereafter result from those great events, no human
wisdom can foresee. By uniting in some
measure the most distant parts of the world,
by enabling them to relieve one another's
wants, to increase one another's enjoyments,
and to encourage one another's industry, their
general tendency would seem to be beneficial.
To the natives, however, both of the East and
West Indies, all the commercial benefits which
can have resulted from those events have been
sunk and lost in the dreadful misfortunes