little more than thirty or forty years (between
1620 and 1660), so numerous and thriving a
people, that the shopkeepers and other traders
of England wished to secure to themselves
the monopoly of their custom. Without
pretending, therefore, that they had paid any
part, either of the original purchase money,
or of the subsequent expense of improvement,
they petitioned the parliament, that the cultivators
of America might for the future be
confined to their shop; first, for buying all
the goods which they wanted from Europe;
and, secondly, for selling all such parts of
their own produce as these traders might find
it convenient to buy. For they did not find
it convenient to buy every part of it. Some
parts of it imported into England, might
have interfered with some of the trades which
they themselves carried on at home. Those
particular parts of it, therefore, they were
willing that the colonists should sell where
they could; the farther off the better; and
upon that account proposed that their market
should be confined to the countries south of
Cape Finisterre. A clause in the famous act
of navigation established this truly shopkeeper
proposal into a law.
The maintenance of this monopoly has
hitherto been the principal, or more properly,
perhaps, the sole end and purpose of the dominion
which Great Britain assumes over her
colonies. In the exclusive trade, it is supposed,
consists the great advantage of provinces,
which have never yet afforded either
revenue or military force for the support of
the civil government, or the defence of the
mother country. The monopoly is the principal
badge of their dependency, and it is the
sole fruit which has hitherto been gathered
from that dependency. Whatever expense
Great Britain has hitherto laid out in maintaining
this dependency, has really been laid
out in order to support this monopoly. The
expense of the ordinary peace establishment
of the colonies amounted, before the commencement
of the present disturbances to the
pay of twenty regiments of foot; to the expense
of the artillery, stores, and extraordinary
provisions, with which it was necessary
to supply them; and to the expense of a very
considerable naval force, which was constantly
kept up, in order to guard from the smuggling
vessels of other nations, the immense
coast of North America, and that of our West
Indian islands. The whole expense of this
peace establishment was a charge upon the
revenue of Great Britain, and was, at the
same time, the smallest part of what the dominion
of the colonies has cost the mother
country. If we would know the amount of
the whole, we must add to the annual expense
of this peace establishment, the interest
of the sums which, in consequence of their
considering her colonies as provinces subject
to her dominion, Great Britain has, upon
different occasions, laid out upon their defence.
We must add to it, in particular, the
whole expense of the late war, and a great
part of that of the war which preceded it.
The late war was altogether a colony quarrel;
and the whole expense of it, in whatever part
of the world it might have been laid out,
whether in Germany or the East Indies,
ought justly to be stated to the account of
the colonies. It amounted to more than
ninety millions sterling, including not only
the new debt which was contracted, but the
two shillings in the pound additional land tax,
and the sums which were every year borrowed
from the sinking fund. The Spanish war
which began in 1739 was principally a colony
quarrel. Its principal object was to prevent
the search of the colony ships, which carried
on a contraband trade with the Spanish Main.
This whole expense is, in reality, a bounty
which has been given in order to support a
monopoly. The pretended purpose of it was
to encourage the manufactures, and to increase
the commerce of Great Britain. But
its real effect has been to raise the rate of
mercantile profit, and to enable our merchants
to turn into a branch of trade, of which the
returns are more slow and distant than those
of the greater part of other trades, a greater
proportion of their capital than they otherwise
would have done; two events which, if a
bounty could have prevented, it might perhaps
have been very well worth while to give
such a bounty.
Under the present system of management,
therefore, Great Britain derives nothing but
loss from the dominion which she assumes over
her colonies.
To propose that Great Britain should voluntarily
give up all authority over her colonies,
and leave them to elect their own magistrates,
to enact their own laws, and to
make peace and war, as they might think
proper, would be to propose such a measure
as never was, and never will be, adopted by
any nation in the world. No nation ever
voluntarily gave up the dominion of any province,
how troublesome soever it might be to
govern it, and how small soever the revenue
which it afforded might be in proportion to
the expense which it occasioned. Such sacrifices,
though they might frequently be
agreeable to the interest, are always mortifying
to the pride of every nation; and, what
is perhaps of still greater consequence, they
are always contrary to the private interest of
the governing part of it, who would thereby
be deprived of the disposal of many places of
trust and profit, of many opportunities of
acquiring wealth and distinction, which the
possession of the most turbulent, and, to the
great body of the people, the most unprofitable
province, seldom fails to afford. The
most visionary enthusiasts would scarce be
capable of proposing such a measure, with