with regard to wheat, the home market
is thus opened to foreign supplies, at prices
considerably lower than before.
By the same statute, the old bounty of 5s.
upon the exportation of wheat, ceases so soon
as the price rises to 44s. the quarter, instead
of 48s. the price at which it ceased before;
that of 2s. 6d. upon the exportation of barley,
ceases so soon as the price rises to 22s.
instead of 24s. the price at which it ceased before;
that of 2s. 6d. upon the exportation of
oatmeal, ceases so soon as the price rises to
14s. instead of 15s. the price at which it ceased
before. The bounty upon rye is reduced
from 3s. 6d. to 3s. and it ceases so soon as
the price rises to 28s. instead of 32s. the price
at which it ceased before. If bounties are as
improper as I have endeavoured to prove
them to be, the sooner they cease, and the
lower they are, so much the better.
The same statute permits, at the lowest
prices, the importation of corn in order to be
exported again, duty free, provided it is in the
mean time lodged in a warehouse under the
joint locks of the king and the importer. This
liberty, indeed, extends to no more than
twenty-five of the different parts of Great
Britain. They are, however, the principal
ones; and there may not, perhaps, be warehouses
proper for this purpose in the greater
part of the others.
So far this law seems evidently an improvement
upon the ancient system.
But by the same law, a bounty of 2s. the
quarter is given for the exportation of oats,
whenever the price does not exceed fourteen
shillings. No bounty had ever been given
before for the exportation of this grain, no
more than for that of pease or beans.
By the same law, too, the exportation of
wheat is prohibited so soon as the price rises
to forty-four shillings the quarter; that of
rye so soon as it rises to twenty-eight shillings;
that of barley so soon as it rises to
twenty-two shillings; and that of oats so soon
as they rise to fourteen shillings. Those several
prices seem all of them a good deal too
low; and there seems to be an impropriety,
besides, in prohibiting exportation altogether
at those precise prices at which that bounty,
which was given in order to force it, is withdrawn.
The bounty ought certainly either to
have been withdrawn at a much lower price,
or exportation ought to have been allowed at
a much higher.
So far, therefore, this law seems to be inferior
to the ancient system. With all its
imperfections, however, we may perhaps say
of it what was said of the laws of Solon, that
though not the best in itself, it is the best
which the interest, prejudices, and temper of
the times, would admit of. It may perhaps
in due time prepare the way for a better.
CHAP. VI.
OF TREATIES OF COMMERCE.
When a nation binds itself by treaty, either
to permit the entry of certain goods from one
foreign country which it prohibits from all
others, or to exempt the goods of one country
from duties to which it subjects those of
all others, the country, or at least the merchants
and manufacturers of the country,
whose commerce is so favoured, must necessarily
derive great advantage from the treaty.
Those merchants and manufacturers enjoy a
sort of monopoly in the country which is so
indulgent to them. That country becomes a
market, both more extensive and more advantageous
for their goods: more extensive, because
the goods of other nations being either
excluded or subjected to heavier duties, it
takes off a greater quantity of theirs; more
advantageous, because the merchants of the
favoured country, enjoying a sort of monopoly
there, will often sell their goods for a better
price than if exposed to the free competition
of all other nations.
Such treaties, however, though they may be
advantageous to the merchants and manufacturers
of the favoured, are necessarily disadvantageous
to those of the favouring country.
A monopoly is thus granted against them to
a foreign nation; and they must frequently
buy the foreign goods they have occasion for,
dearer than if the free competition of other
nations was admitted. That part of its own
produce with which such a nation purchases
foreign goods, must consequently be sold
cheaper; because, when two things are exchanged
for one another, the cheapness of the
one is a necessary consequence, or rather is
the same thing, with the dearness of the other.
The exchangeable value of its annual produce,
therefore, is likely to be diminished by
every such treaty. This diminution, however,
can scarce amount to any positive loss,
but only to a lessening of the gain which it
might otherwise make. Though it sells its
goods cheaper than it otherwise might do, it
will not probably sell them for less than they
cost; nor, as in the case of bounties, for a
price which will not replace the capital employed
in bringing them to market, together
with the ordinary profits of stock. The trade
could not go on long if it did. Even the favouring
country, therefore, may still gain by
the trade, though less than if there was a free
competition.
Some treaties of commerce, however, have
been supposed advantageous, upon principles
very different from these; and a commercial
country has sometimes granted a monopoly of