persons not being forestallers, that is, not selling
again in the same market within three
months. All the freedom which the trade of
the inland corn dealer has ever yet enjoyed
was bestowed upon it by this statute. The
statute of the twelfth of the present king,
which repeals almost all the other ancient
laws against engrossers and forestallers, does
not repeal the restrictions of this particular
statute, which therefore still continue in force.
This statute, however, authorises in some
measure two very absurd popular prejudices.
First, It supposes, that when the price of
wheat has risen so high as 48s. the quarter,
and that of other grain in proportion, corn is
likely to be so engrossed as to hurt the people.
But, from what has been already said, it seems
evident enough, that corn can at no price be
so engrossed by the inland dealers as to hurt
the people; and 48s. the quarter, besides,
though it may be considered as a very high
price, yet, in years of scarcity, it is a price
which frequently takes place immediately after
harvest, when scarce any part of the new
crop can be sold off, and when it is impossible
even for ignorance to suppose that any part of
it can be so engrossed as to hurt the people.
Secondly, It supposes that there is a certain
price at which corn is likely to be forestalled,
that is, bought up in order to be sold again
soon after in the same market, so as to hurt
the people. But if a merchant ever buys up
corn, either going to a particular market, or
in a particular market, in order to sell it
again soon after in the same market, it
must be because he judges that the market
cannot be so liberally supplied through the
whole season as upon that particular occasion,
and that the price, therefore, must
rise. If he judges wrong in this, and if the
price does not rise, he not only loses the whole
profit of the stock which he employs in this
manner, but a part of the stock itself, by the
expense and loss which necessarily attend the
storing and keeping of corn. He hurts himself,
therefore, much more essentially than he
can hurt even the particular people whom he
may hinder from supplying themselves upon
that particular market day, because they may
afterwards supply themselves just as cheap upon
any other market day. If he judges right,
instead of hurting the great body of the people,
he renders them a most important service.
By making them feel the inconveniencies
of a dearth somewhat earlier than they
otherwise might do, he prevents their feeling
them afterwards so severely as they certainly
would do, if the cheapness of price encouraged
them to consume faster than suited the
real scarcity of the season. When the scarcity
is real, the best thing that can be done for
people is, to divide the inconvenience of it as
equally as possible, through all the different
months and weeks and days of the year. The
interest of the corn merchant makes him study
to do this as exactly as he can; and as no
other person can have either the same interest,
or the same knowledge, or the same abilities,
to do it so exactly as he, this most important
operation of commerce ought to be
trusted entirely to him; or, in other words,
the corn trade, so far at least as concerns the
supply of the home market, ought to be left
perfectly free.
The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling
may be compared to the popular terrors
and suspicions of witchcraft. The unfortunate
wretches accused of this latter crime
were not more innocent of the misfortunes
imputed to them, than those who have been accused
of the former. The law which put an end
to all prosecutions against witchcraft, which put
it out of any man's power to gratify his own
malice by accusing his neighbour of that imaginary
crime, seems effectually to have put
an end to those fears and suspicions, by taking
away the great cause which encouraged
and supported them. The law which would
restore entire freedom to the inland trade of
corn, would probably prove as effectual to put
an end to the popular fears of engrossing and
forestalling.
The 15th of Charles II. c. 7, however, with
all its imperfections, has, perhaps, contributed
more, both to the plentiful supply of the home
market, and to the increase of tillage, than
any other law in the statute book. It is from
this law that the inland corn trade has derived
all the liberty and protection which it
has ever yet enjoyed; and both the supply of
the home market and the interest of tillage
are much more effectually promoted by the
inland, than either by the importation or exportation
trade.
The proportion of the average quantity of
all sorts of grain imported into Great Britain
to that of all sorts of grain consumed, it has
been computed by the author of the Tracts
upon the Corn Trade, does not exceed that of
one to five hundred and seventy. For supplying
the home market, therefore, the importance
of the inland trade must be to that
of the importation trade as five hundred and
seventy to one.
The average quantity of all sorts of grain
exported from Great Britain does not, according
to the same author, exceed the one-and-thirtieth
part of the annual produce. For the
encouragement of tillage, therefore, by providing
a market for the home produce, the
importance of the inland trade must be to that
of the exportation trade as thirty to one.
I have no great faith in political arithmetic,
and I mean not to warrant the exactness of
either of these computations. I mention them
only in order to show of how much less consequence,
in the opinion of the most judicious
and experienced persons, the foreign trade of
corn is than the home trade. The great cheapness
of corn in the years immediately preceding