the receiver-general of the customs in equal
half-yearly payments. Besides this great company,
the residence of whose governor and
directors was to be in London, it was declared
lawful to erect different fishing chambers in
all the different out-ports of the kingdom,
provided a sum not less than L.10,000 was
subscribed into the capital of each, to be managed
at its own risk, and for its own profit
and loss. The same annuity, and the same
encouragements of all kinds, were given to
the trade of those inferior chambers as to that
of the great company. The subscription of
the great company was soon filled up, and several
different fishing chambers were erected
in the different out-ports of the kingdom. In
spite of all these encouragements, almost all
those different companies, both great and
small, lost either the whole or the greater
part of their capitals; scarce a vestige now
remains of any of them, and the white-herring
fishery is now entirely, or almost entirely, carried
on by private adventurers.
If any particular manufacture was necessary,
indeed, for the defence of the society, it
might not always be prudent to depend upon
our neighbours for the supply; and if such
manufacture could not otherwise be supported
at home, it might not be unreasonable that all
the other branches of industry should be taxed
in order to support it. The bounties upon
the exportation of British made sail-cloth, and
British made gunpowder, may, perhaps, both
be vindicated upon this principle.
But though it can very seldom be reasonable
to tax the industry of the great body of
the people, in order to support that of some
particular class of manufacturers; yet, in the
wantonness of great prosperity, when the public
enjoys a greater revenue than it knows
well what to do with, to give such bounties
to favourite manufactures, may, perhaps, be
as natural as to incur any other idle expense.
In public, as well as in private expenses, great
wealth, may, perhaps, frequently be admitted
as an apology for great folly. But there must
surely be something more than ordinary absurdity
in continuing such profusion in times
of general difficulty and distress.
What is called a bounty, is sometimes no
more than a drawback, and, consequently, is
not liable to the same objections as what is
properly a bounty. The bounty, for example,
upon refined sugar exported, may be considered
as a drawback of the duties upon the
brown and Muscovado sugars, from which it
is made; the bounty upon wrought silk exported,
a drawback of the duties upon raw and
thrown silk imported; the bounty upon gunpowder
exported, a drawback of the duties
upon brimstone and saltpetre imported. In
the language of the customs, those allowances
only are called drawbacks which are given
upon goods exported in the same form in which
they are imported. When that form has been
so altered by manufacture of any kind as to
come under a new denomination, they are
called bounties.
Premiums given by the public to artists
and manufacturers, who excel in their particular
occupations, are not liable to the same
objections as bounties. By encouraging extraordinary
dexterity and ingenuity, they serve
to keep up the emulation of the workmen actually
employed in those respective occupations,
and are not considerable enough to
turn towards any one of them a greater share
of the capital of the country than what would
go to it of its own accord. Their tendency
is not to overturn the natural balance of employments,
but to render the work which is
done in each as perfect and complete as possible.
The expense of premiums, besides, is
very trifling, that of bounties very great. The
bounty upon corn alone has sometimes cost
the public, in one year, more than L.300,000.
Bounties are sometimes called premiums,
as drawbacks are sometimes called bounties.
But we must, in all cases, attend to the nature
of the thing, without paying any regard
to the word.
Digression concerning the Corn Trade and
Corn Laws.
I cannot conclude this chapter concerning
bounties, without observing, that the praises
which have been bestowed upon the law which
establishes the bounty upon the exportation of
corn, and upon that system of regulations
which is connected with it, are altogether unmerited.
A particular examination of the nature
of the corn trade, and of the principal
British laws which relate to it, will sufficiently
demonstrate the truth of this assertion. The
great importance of this subject must justify
the length of the digression.
The trade of the corn merchant is composed
of four different branches, which, though they
may sometimes be all carried on by the same
person, are, in their own nature, four separate
and distinct trades. These are, first, the
trade of the inland dealer; secondly, that of
the merchant-importer for home consumption;
thirdly, that of the merchant-exporter of home
produce for foreign consumption; and, fourthly,
that of the merchant-carrier, or of the importer
of corn, in order to export it again.
I. The interest of the inland dealer, and
that of the great body of the people, how opposite
soever they may at first appear, are,
even in years of the greatest scarcity, exactly
the same. It is his interest to raise the price
of his corn as high as the real scarcity of the
season requires, and it can never be his interest
to raise it higher. By raising the price,
he discourages the consumption, and puts
every body more or less, but particularly the
inferior ranks of people, upon thrift and good